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This article examines the impact of civil war on democratization, particu-
larly focusing on whether civil war provides an opportunity for institu-
tional reform. We investigate the impact of war termination in general,
along with prolonged violence, rebel victory and international interven-
tion on democratization. Using an unbalanced panel data set of 96 coun-
tries covering a 34-year period, our analysis suggests that civil war lowers
democratization in the succeeding period. Our ﬁndings also suggest that
United Nations intervention increases democratization, as do wars ending
in stalemates. However, wars ending in rebel victories seem to reduce
democratization. These ﬁndings appear robust to conditioning, different
instrument sets, modelling techniques and the measurement of democracy.
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of war
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I. Introduction
With the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq at the end
of 2011, the reduction of international forces from
Afghanistan and the ongoing civil war in Syria,
uncertainty remains whether democracy emerges
post-conﬂict. The fragile nature of democracy in
Iraq, the inability to foster democratic governance
in Afghanistan and calls for democratization in
Syria bring into question the efforts of the USA and
its partners to build democratic systems in the after-
math of civil conﬂict. The literature on democratiza-
tion suggests that the prospect of conﬂict encourages
the emergence of democratic institutions (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006). However, after a civil war, the
likelihood of future conﬂict and political decay
undoubtedly increases. Still, while ‘turnarounds’ in
failing states are rare, they are more likely to occur in
a post-war environment (Chauvet and Collier, 2009).
Our article seeks to answer the question of whether
democratic turnarounds are more or less likely in a
post-war environment. That is, does the post-war
environment set states on a more democratic trajec-
tory than their nonwarring counterparts?
This article examines the inﬂuence of civil war on
democratization. If civil war or the characteristics of
its termination incentivize the emergence of democ-
racy, then international institutions and parties to
civil war are likely to have a keen interest in these
incentives. Enhancing or attenuating these incen-
tives may increase the likelihood of democratiza-
tion. On the other hand, if civil war does not alter the
likelihood of democratization, then this implies that
the literature does not clearly portray the mechan-
isms of democratization. This ﬁnding would also
suggest that much of the current effort to foster
democracy in conﬂict-prone regions is prone to
failure.
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The remainder of this article is structured as fol-
lows. The next section brieﬂy reviews the literature
on democratization and develops several testable
hypotheses. The third section describes the data and
discusses the estimation methodology. The fourth
section presents and considers the results. The last
section concludes and discusses opportunities for
future research.
II. Review of the Literature
Civil war appears to be a development trap (Collier
and Hoefﬂer, 2004; Collier, 2008). However, as such,
theory suggests that democracy may arise as a com-
promise to prevent and settle wars. That is, the eco-
nomic costs of conﬂict may encourage parties to
democratize (Rosendorff, 2001). There are good rea-
sons that this might be an attractive political out-
come: democracies may be attractive given their
economic performance relative to autocracies over
time (Gleditsch, 2002). Democratic governance,
while imperfect, is relatively efﬁcient and effective
when compared to other forms of governance
(Sen, 2000) and appears to be growth enhancing
(Perotti, 1996).
Empirical literature examining post-war democra-
tization has not clearly established the implications
of war on democracy. Fortna and Huang (2012) point
out that post-war countries sometimes democratize
and sometimes do not, but that countries that demo-
cratize post-war are much like those that would with-
out a war. This leaves open an important question:
controlling for drivers of democracy, does civil war
make a difference in democratization?
Our ﬁrst empirical question is whether the termi-
nation of a civil war affects democratization in the
succeeding period? From the theoretical literature,
we would hypothesize that, as in Chauvet and
Collier’s (2009) work on failing states, war offers a
unique opportunity to build new institutions that
others may not possess. The theoretical literature
postulates that civil war occurs because a democratic
solution is untenable to the conﬂicting parties and
that they are willing to bear the cost of war. War
essentially substitutes for peaceful democratic com-
petition (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The termi-
nation of war suggests that the cost of war has grown
too signiﬁcant (resource exhaustion) or that one party
triumphed over the other (military victory). The con-
clusion of civil war should create opportunities for
reform.
Beyond the question of whether civil war termina-
tion affects democratization, we desire to explore
whether the conditions of termination affect demo-
cratization in the succeeding period. The growing
body of literature that analyses pre-war versus post-
war outcomes considers many of these factors (e.g.
Gurses and Mason, 2008; DeRouen et al., 2010;
Joshi, 2010; Fortna and Huang, 2012). Using non-
warring countries as a control to measure whether
wars that end in certain ways make countries more
democratic than their nonwarring counterparts, we
believe complements this line of research.
Our second empirical test is whether civil war
duration affects democratization in the succeeding
period. Third, we test whether a clear military victory
impacts democratization. Here we should observe
two effects: that the extended duration of a civil war
positively affects democratization in the succeeding
period, and that a civil war ending with no clear
victor positively affects democratization in the suc-
ceeding period. Protracted conﬂicts may result in the
realization that neither side is likely to prevail and
that the beneﬁts of peace outweigh the beneﬁts of
continued conﬂict (Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004;
Wantchekon, 2004). Democratic governance is a
potential method for sharing the beneﬁts of ending
a conﬂict; otherwise, there would be an incentive for
one or more of the parties to continue warfare.
Wantchekon (2004) goes on to explain that ‘democ-
racy will become the natural outcome of civil wars,
provided that there is military stalemate and the fac-
tions are economically dependent on citizens’ pro-
ductive investments’. A counterpoint to this idea
comes from DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) and
DeRouen et al. (2010): military victories appear to
provide a more enduring peace and a result of nego-
tiated settlements may be that suffer from enduring
rivalries that promote continued conﬂict (DeRouen
and Bercovitch, 2008).
Alternatively, wars may end in government or
rebel victories, and one might want to believe that
rebels, ﬁghting for freedom from government
oppression, are more likely to democratize; however,
it seems more likely that if either side wins a war it
has incentives to consolidate power. Empirical stu-
dies of post-war samples have suggested that if a
conﬂict ends with military victory, democratization
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is less likely to occur (Gurses and Mason, 2008). A
rebel victory may lead to internal violence and
oppression as rebels settle ‘scores’ and, often, are
unprepared for the tasks of governance. A victory
by the government also reduces the incentive to
liberalize society.
Our last empirical question is whether United
Nations (UN) intervention in a civil war affects
post-war democratization? When peacekeeping is
part of ending a civil war, there is a possibility for
greater state capacity and as a result a pathway to
democratization. As with a stalemate, peacekeeping
forces negotiations that may lead both sides to
democratization. There is a sizeable literature on
the role of UN intervention and it produces mixed
conclusions on its effectiveness at either building
state capacity or creating lasting peace. McBride
et al. (2011) suggest that outsiders can play a critical
role in encouraging power sharing through invest-
ments in state capacity. Put another way, external
intervention may inﬂuence democratization by
allowing for the formation of credible commitments
(Walter, 2001; Fortna, 2004). UN intervention
appears to generate stable peace and democracy in
‘nonidentity wars’ (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).
UN intervention may also accelerate the occurrence
of democratic elections, although early elections
may provide an incentive for the emergence of
individuals and parties who favour a return to con-
ﬂict (e.g. Hoddie and Hartzell, 2010; Joshi, 2010;
Brancati and Snyder, 2011). This question is far
from settled, however, as other studies have found
that UN intervention has had no statistically signiﬁ-
cant impact on democratization (Fortna and
Huang, 2012) and that intervention can prolong
war (Cronin, 2010). Outsiders, either unwittingly,
or because of conﬂicting objectives, also may
undermine state capacity (McBride et al., 2011).
In summary, there are arguments in the literature
for the positive inﬂuence of civil war termination,
duration and the absence of a clear victor on demo-
cratization in the succeeding period. Rebel victory,
on the other hand, is more likely to reduce democra-
tization. There is also a lack of consensus on howUN
intervention impacts democratization. It should not
be surprising that the literature has not answered
these questions, even though statements of policy-
makers would suggest that there is strong evidence
for democratization following the conclusion of civil
wars.
III. Empirical Analysis
The choice of democracy index and empirical meth-
odology may signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the conclusions
with respect to the emergence (or lack thereof) of
democracy. Most papers employ either the Freedom
House measures of civil liberties and political rights
or the Polity IV democracy score, each of which
employs a different strategy for measuring democ-
racy and, as a result, contain measurement error.
Some researchers use OLS or Tobit estimators to
argue that a variety of factors including resource
rents and war characteristics signiﬁcantly inﬂuence
democratization (Ross, 2001; Epstein et al., 2006;
Fortna and Huang, 2012). These ﬁndings are subject
to suspicion, however, due to the presence of coun-
try-speciﬁc effects and the persistence of democracy.
When using a difference generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator to control for these coun-
try-speciﬁc effects and the persistence of the democ-
racy (and other) variables, factors such as education
and income no longer appear to have a statistically
signiﬁcant inﬂuence on democratization (Acemoglu
et al., 2005, 2008).
More recently, an argument has emerged from the
literature that, in small samples, the system GMM
estimator is not only consistent with, but also rela-
tively efﬁcient, compared to the difference GMM
estimator when empirically investigating the determi-
nants of democratization (see Castelló-Climent, 2008;
Aslaksen, 2010; Csordás and Ludwig, 2011; Heid
et al., 2012). These studies have found limited evi-
dence for a statistically signiﬁcant relationship
between resource rents, education, economic growth
and democratization. We seek to build upon this
empirical literature to examine the inﬂuence of civil
war termination on democratization.
Data and model specification
One common problem in cross-country studies of
democratization is how to properly measure
democracy and transitions between regime types.
Democratization is a complex process involving
many public and private institutions, and we readily
acknowledge that any measure is likely to be imper-
fect. Ideally, we would construct a panel data set of
civil and political institutions to effectively quantify
the democratically oriented activities of society. This
would demand not only signiﬁcant knowledge about
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formal institutions but also informal institutions.
Constructing such a panel data set would require
information not only on the political, administrative
and ﬁscal operation of the central government but
also on subnational governments. Unfortunately, we
cannot readily address these issues with the available
data. We are left with the standard, although imper-
fect, measures of democracy.
Several measures of democracy, not surprisingly,
are available. The Freedom House, for example,
constructs measures of civil and political rights,
which many authors use to construct a composite
measure of democracy. More recently, the World
Bank has created a composite measure of ‘voice
and accountability’ that uses the Freedom House
measure, among others. The Polity IVmeasure quan-
tiﬁes democratic and autocratic characteristics of
governing institutions and subtracts the autocracy
score from the democracy score for its composite
index. Both of these measures, however, include
violent conﬂict in their scores (it reduces democracy
in both cases), which biases the measurement of
democracy downward during conﬂict and upwards
post-conﬂict. Unfortunately, the components of the
Freedom House measures, and by extension the
World Bank measure, are not readily available and
we are unable to decompose these measures net of
conﬂict. We can, however, examine the components
of the Polity IV measures of democracy and auto-
cracy. Two components of the polity score contain
conﬂict as a criterion (Vreeland, 2008). We
follow Vreeland, and subtract the Regulation of
Participation and Competitiveness of Participation
components of the democracy score as these mea-
sures include aspects of conﬂict. While Vreeland’s
revised polity score is our preferred measure of
democracy, to examine the robustness of our results
to alternative speciﬁcations, we compare our revised
measure of democracy to the Freedom House
measure.
With regards to the nature of the democracy data,
we follow Treisman (2011) in arguing that democ-
racy is ‘mostly continuous’. The Polity IV and
Freedom House data attempt to measure democracy
across a range of possible outcomes, from the com-
plete lack of democracy (freedom) to a completely
democratic (free) society. These measures are imper-
fect; however, we treat them as continuous variables
for the sake of analysis. Still, in the section
‘Alternative measures of democracy’ we relax this
assumption and use the Wooldridge (2005) method
to treat these as count variables because of their
integer values.
To build our ﬁnal data set, we include control
variables from a variety of sources. We use data on
GDP and economic openness (the sum of imports
and exports as a share of GDP from the Penn World
Tables; Heston et al., 2011). We obtain population
and other socio-economic data from the World Bank
(2012). For consistency with the literature, we also
include a measure of human capital using Barro and
Lee’s education measure that takes the average num-
ber of years of schooling of the population over the
age of 25. Finally, we construct a measure of natural
resource rents as a share of GDP.1
Data on conﬂict come largely from the Correlates
of War data set (Sarkees and Wayman, 2010). The
Correlates of War deﬁnes a civil war as between a
government and one or more armed internal non-
state groups and requires 1000 battle-related deaths
per year to qualify for inclusion. They use these
criteria to assign a date to conﬂict termination.
Using this data, we are able to include the duration
of a war and the type of war termination experienced
(Stalemate or Rebel Victory). We also build on
Sambanis and Doyle’s (2000) data set for UN inter-
vention and add observations from the UN (Sarkees
and Wayman, 2010). Table 1 deﬁnes the variables
used in the empirical model and their sources.
Tables 2 and 3 present descriptive statistics of
these variables, the sample countries and time per-
iods, respectively.
For each country in the sample, we have potentially
one observation for each of the sub-periods (1970–
1974, 1975–1979, 1980–1984, 1985–1989, 1990–
1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004).We use 5-year periods
because the annual data are noisy and we are con-
cerned that using annual data may result in spurious
correlations. Second, we seek to avoid short-term
ﬂuctuations and focus on changes in the variables
across longer swaths of time (Fortna and
Huang, 2012). We also investigate whether the results
are robust to alternative measures of democracy, esti-
mators, control variables and instrument count (see
Jensen and Wantchekon, 2004; Wantchekon, 2004;
Roodman, 2008). Combining the polity data with
1We obtained similar results examining rents as a share of population and excluding all but oil rents. These results are
available upon request.
1866 L. E. Armey and R. M. McNab
data extracted from other sources results in a data set
of 620 observations. The ﬁnal panel data set is unba-
lanced and covers 96 countries from 1970 to 2004.
This data set is available at the link provided in the
supplementary data set section of this paper.
We deﬁne the dependent variable, Democracy, as
the Polity IV score for democracy net of the
Regulation of Participation and Competitiveness of
Participation components of the democracy score.
For robustness, we deﬁne Democracy-Alternate as
the Freedom House measure of democracy.
Following the Correlates of War database (Sarkees
and Wayman, 2010), we deﬁne war as a dummy
variable that is equal to one if a war starts or is
ongoing in a period, 0 otherwise. The end of conﬂict
(War End) is also a dummy variable, coded 1 if a war
Table 2. Descriptive statistics
Series N Mean SD Minimum Maximum
Democracy (polity) 620 1.91 4.56 −6 7
Population 620 45 397 141 628 455.15 1 300 000
GDP per capita 620 7760 9080 345.97 44 813
Openness to international trade 620 64.74 44.33 5.31 412.16
Rents to GDP 620 7.03 10.17 0 74.68
Average years school 510 5.26 3.027 0.23 13
War end 620 0.08 0.27 0 1
Duration 620 0.28 1.56 0 20
UN intervention 620 0.01 0.11 0 1
Democracy (Freedom House) 533 0.55 0.32 0 1
Democracy (normalized) 620 0.61 0.35 0 1
Table 1. Variables
Variable Deﬁnition Units Source
Democracy
(polity)
The degree of openness of democratic
institutions.
−6−7 Polity IV with Vreeland (2008) modiﬁcation
Population Natural log of population at start of period Penn World Tables 7.0
Heston et al. (2011)
GDP per capita Natural log of purchasing power parity adjusted
GDP per capita at the start of the period.
Penn World Tables 7.0




Measured as the sum of exports and imports as a
share of GDP
Penn World Tables 7.0
Heston et al. (2011)
Education Measures the average number of years of
schooling of the population over the age of 25
www.barrolee.com
Rents to GDP Measures the difference between the value of
production of natural resources and total costs
of production. This is a cumulative measure of
oil, natural gas, mineral, coal and forest rents.
World Development Indicators http://
databank.worldbank.org
War End Takes the value of 1 if a civil war ended during
the period
0,1 Correlates of War
Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
Stalemate Takes the value of 1 if a civil war ended in a
stalemate during the period
0,1 Correlates of War
Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
Rebel victory Takes the value of 1 if a civil war ended in a rebel
victory during the period
0,1 Correlates of War
Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
Duration Evaluated in the period the conﬂict ends; it takes
on the number of years a conﬂict was ongoing
Correlates of War
Sarkees and Wayman (2010)
UN intervention This variable takes the value of 1 if a war ended
and there was UN intervention during the
period
0,1 Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and http://www.
un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations
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ends in the period and 0 otherwise. Likewise, we
create dummy variables to capture a rebel victory
(Rebel Win), United Nations military intervention
(UN Intervention) and a count variable to capture
the duration of the conﬂict in years at its conclusion
(Duration). A matrix X of control variables includes
population, population density, GDP per capita,
natural resource endowments and openness to
Table 3. Sample countries
Country Years Country Years
Algeria 1970–2004 Japan 1970–2004
Argentina 1970–2004 Kenya* 1970–2004
Australia* 1970–2004 Lesotho 1970–1999, 2005–2004
Austria* 1970–2004 Madagascar 1970–2004
Bangladesh 1975–2004 Malawi 1970–2004
Belgium* 1970–2004 Malaysia 1970–2004
Benin 1975–1989, 1999–2004 Mali 1970–2004
Bolivia 1970–2004 Mauritania* 1970–2004
Botswana 1970–2004 Mexico 1970–2004
Brazil 1970–2004 Morocco 1970–2004
Burkina Faso 1970–2004 Namibia* 1990–2004
Burundi 1970–1994, 2000–2004 Nepal 1970–2004
Cameroon 1970–2004 The Netherlands* 1970–2004
Canada* 1970–2004 Nicaragua 1970–1979, 1985–2004
Central African Republic 1970–2004 Niger 1970–2004
Chad 1970–1979, 1985–2004 Nigeria 1970–2004
Chile 1970–2004 Norway* 1970–2004
China 1970–2004 Pakistan 1975–2004
Colombia 1970–2004 Papua New Guinea* 1975–2004
Congo 1970–2004 Paraguay 1970–2004
Costa Rica* 1970–2004 Peru 1970–1999
Cote d’Ivoire 1970–2004 Philippines 1970–2004
Cuba* 1970–2004 Portugal 1970–1974, 1980–2004
Democratic Republic of the Congo* 1970–1994 Qatar 1975–2004
Denmark* 1970–2004 Romania 1970–2004
Dominican Republic 1970–2004 Rwanda 1970–2004
Ecuador 1970–2004 Senegal 1970–2004
Egypt* 1970–2004 Sierra Leone 1970–1999
El Salvador 1970–1979, 1985–2004 Singapore* 1970–2004
Fiji 1970–1999 South Africa* 1970–2004
Finland* 1970–2004 South Korea 1970–2004
France 1970–2004 Spain 1970–1974, 1980–2004
Gabon 1974–1989, 1999–2004 Sri Lanka 1970–2004
Gambia 1970–1989, 1995–2004 Sudan 1975–1984, 1990–2004
Germany* 1994–2004 Swaziland 1970–2004
Ghana 1970–2004 Sweden* 1970–2004
Greece 1970–2004 Syria 1970–2004
Guatemala 1970–1984, 1990–2004 Thailand 1970–2004
Guyana 1970–2004 Togo 1970–2004
Haiti 1970–2004 Trinidad and Tobago* 1970–2004
Honduras 1970–1979, 1985–2004 Tunisia 1970–2004
Hungary 1970–2004 Turkey 1970–2004
India 1970–2004 Uganda 1970–1984, 1990–2004
Indonesia 1970–2004 United Kingdom* 1970–2004
Iran 1970–1979, 1985–2004 United States* 1970–2004
Ireland* 1970–2004 Uruguay 1970–2004
Israel* 1970–2004 Venezuela 1970–2004
Italy* 1970–2004 Zambia 1970–2004
Note: *Indicates no variation in X-Polity score for the duration.
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international trade (Levine and Renelt, 1992;
Gleditsch, 2002).
We employ the following estimation strategy to
estimate the impact of civil war on democratization:
Democracyi;t ¼ α0 þ β Democracyi;t#1 þ τwi;t#k
þ γXi;t#k þ ci þ λt þ ui;t
(1)
where ci and λt denote the unobserved country and
time effects. The subscripts i, k and t denote country,
lags and time period, respectively. The binary indi-
cator, w, indicates whether a war has ended. The
coefﬁcient τ captures the treatment effect of interest.
We assume that the error term, ui,t, follows a random
walk. The error components’ speciﬁcation accounts
for time-invariant characteristics that may inﬂuence
the development of democracy, to include colonial
heritage, geographic location and cultural character-
istics, among others. The speciﬁcation also accounts
for unobservable global trends that may also inﬂu-
ence the development of democracy.
Econometric issues
We began by examining whether the variables of
interest exhibit a unit root process as the presence
of a unit root, unless N and T grow large, is likely
to induce inconsistent and biased estimates
(Baltagi, 2008). We employ Fisher’s test to examine
the null hypothesis that all the series are stationary
versus the alternative that at least one series is sta-
tionary (Maddala and Wu, 1999). We reject the null
hypothesis of nonstationarity for our measure of
democracy and the macroeconomic independent
variables at the 1% level of signiﬁcance.2
We ﬁrst present results from pooled OLS and two-
way error components estimators. We note that the
pooled OLS model explicitly assumes the country-
speciﬁc effects are equal to zero and, in the presence
of persistent effects, is inconsistent. If one suspects
country- or time-speciﬁc effects impact the depen-
dent variable, that is, country or time period charac-
teristics impact democracy, then one can take these
effects into account using error component estima-
tors. We examine whether to employ a ﬁxed or ran-
dom effects error components estimator using a
Hausman test and reject the null hypothesis of the
exogeneity of the components and the regressors at
the 1% level of signiﬁcance.3 We thus conclude that
the random effects GLS estimator is inconsistent and
employs the less efﬁcient, but consistent (under spe-
ciﬁc assumptions about the exogeneity of the policy
instruments) within- or ﬁxed-effects estimator. In
addition, using the ﬁxed-effects estimator, we reject
the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity at the
1% level of signiﬁcance.4 We reject the null hypoth-
esis of no serial correlation at the 1% level
(Wooldridge, 2001; Drukker, 2003).5 Finally, we
reject the null hypothesis that the individual and
time-speciﬁc effects are jointly equal to zero at the
1% level of signiﬁcance and thus employ the two-
way within estimator throughout the remainder of the
article.
Within estimators, however, preclude the use of
several time-invariant variables used in previous lit-
erature (Gassebner et al., 2013). In addition, we must
make caveats to employ the within estimator. First,
the policy indicator (w) must be strictly exogenous to
the uit, else the within estimator is inconsistent. If the
policy assignment changes in reaction to past out-
comes on yit, then it violates strict exogeneity. In
cases where wit = 1 whenever wir = 1 for r < t, strict
exogeneity is usually a reasonable assumption; how-
ever, this implies that once a war begins, it does not
end or, conversely, that when there is no war at time r,
there is no war at time t. Our interest lies in those
cases where war in time r is succeeded by an end to
conﬂict at time t, that is, the cases of wit = 0 that are
2We run Fisher’s test without and with a trend variable for democracy, log of GDP, openness to international trade and
population, among others. Detailed test statistics are available upon request.
3Comparing a two-way random-effects GLS estimator and a two-way within estimator, we reject the null hypothesis that
the differences in the two sets of estimated coefﬁcients are not systematic with a chi-squared test with 11 degrees of freedom
and a resultant test statistic of 23.07.
4We employ a Breusch–Pagan test and reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity with a chi-squared test with 1 degree
of freedom and resultant test statistics of 13.95 and 56.89 for the within estimator without and with a lagged dependent
variable, respectively.
5We employ the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in the panel data and reject the null hypothesis of no ﬁrst-order
autocorrelation with a F(1,87) test statistic of 39.802 and 92.771 for the within estimator without and with a lagged
dependent variable, respectively.
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preceded by wir = 1. We are thus concerned that this
treatment effect violates the strict exogeneity
assumption, rendering the within estimator inconsis-
tent. We also note that the within estimator may be
biased and inconsistent in samples with large N and
small T and the presence of a lagged dependent vari-
able is mechanically correlated with the error term,
violating its strict exogeneity (Perotti, 1996).
Accordingly, we are immediately confronted with
signiﬁcant econometric issues that, if left uncor-
rected, are likely to result in inconsistent and biased
estimates. As democracy may slowly change over
time, it is also probable that the current level of
democracy is dependent upon the level of democracy
in the previous period. While there are signiﬁcant
variations in the level of democracy across countries,
democracy is relatively stable within countries. Of
the 96 countries in the sample, 26 experienced no
change in the level of democracy throughout their
sample period. The individual effects, characterizing
the heterogeneity among countries, are a second
source of persistence over time. Finally, we are con-
cerned that some of the traditional determinants of
democracy, including GDP per capita, are endogen-
ous. Previous explorations of the determinants of
democracy that do not take these potential econo-
metric issues into account are likely to be suspect due
to the inconsistent nature of their estimators.
Several instrument variable approaches are avail-
able to address systematic endogeneity, including
using lags of the dependent variable as an explana-
tory variable. The Anderson-Hsiao Instrumental
Variables (IV) estimator takes the ﬁrst difference of
all variables, then instruments for the ﬁrst difference
of the lagged dependent variable with the second
lagged level of the dependent variable (Anderson
and Hsiao, 1982). This IV estimator is consistent
but relatively inefﬁcient in the presence of a lagged
dependent variable and signiﬁcant individual effects.
The difference GMM estimator, on the other hand, is
consistent, relatively more efﬁcient than the IV esti-
mator, and employs all available lagged levels of the
dependent variable, beginning with the second lag, as
instruments for the lagged difference of the depen-
dent variable (Arellano and Bond, 1991). We can
also use the difference GMM estimator to treat
regressors such as GDP per capita as endogenous
using second and deeper lagged levels of GDP as
instruments for its ﬁrst difference.
The persistence in the levels of education, natural
resources and democracy may account for the insig-
niﬁcant relationships inmuch of the literature employ-
ing ﬁxed-effects and various difference estimators
(Aslaksen, 2010). The difference GMM estimator,
however, may also be inefﬁcient because levels may
not be good instruments for differences. Differences
may be a superior instrument for the levels
(Roodman, 2006). Therefore, in addition to the differ-
ence GMM estimator, we employ a system-GMM
estimator that uses all available lagged differences as
instruments for the lagged levels (Arellano and
Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). The short T
and persistent series appear to support the extra
moment conditions of the system GMM vice the
difference GMM (Baltagi, 2008). The system GMM
estimator should thus produce dramatic efﬁciency
gains over the difference GMM as the persistence
effect of the dependent variable grows (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). Finally, regardless of the GMM estima-
tor’s form, GMM estimators offer SEs that are robust
to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
Researchers have several options available to them
when using GMM estimators that incur important
trade-offs. We report the results of several speciﬁca-
tions, per Roodman’s (2008) advice, to ensure
robustness to speciﬁcation choices. Speciﬁcally, we
can execute GMM using a one- or two-step process.
The one-step estimator provides estimated SEs
robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
The two-step process is generally more efﬁcient and
naturally resilient to heteroscedasticity but tends to
downward bias SEs enough to make inference
impossible when instrument counts are large
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The two-step process
with Windmeijer (2000) corrected SEs may amelio-
rate the problems with SEs; we report this as well.
We also explore the sensitivity of our results to
changes in the set of instruments. Instrument prolif-
eration can overﬁt endogenous variables and weaken
Hansen tests.6 We collapse the instrument matrix and
limit the number of lags to control for instrument
proliferation (Roodman, 2008). In some speciﬁca-
tions, we employ forward orthogonal deviations
which can preserve the size of a data set with gaps,
6GMM estimators with too many moment conditions can be subject to overﬁtting biases in small samples (Bond, 2002).
We thus compare the unrestricted and restricted estimates, and the loss of information from deep lags is thought to be
minimal.
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a problem encountered with our data, by using the
future differences to instrument for past differences
(Arellano and Bover, 1995). For the purposes of this
article, we present the unrestricted, one-step GMM
estimates, the one-step estimates with collapsed
instruments and a lag-limit of three, and the two-
step estimates with collapsed, forward orthogonal
instruments and a lag-limit of three.7
This approach allows us to compare and contrast
the unrestricted GMM estimates with the restricted
GMM estimates. The unrestricted model, by using all
available lag lengths, allows for the possibility of
deep lags inﬂuencing the current level of democracy.
Using deep lags can, however, cause excessive
instrument proliferation and overﬁtting of endogen-
ous variable(s). We employ the Sargan test (for both
the difference and system GMM estimators) and the
differences-in-Hansen test (for the system GMM
estimator) to determine the appropriate restrictions,
to include lag length, collapsing the instrument
matrix and using forward orthogonal deviations.
Finally, we report the results of several standard
tests employed to validate GMM estimates. We test
the hypothesis that the error term is serially correlated
in the ﬁrst order and not serially correlated in the
second order. We test the validity of the moment
conditions by using the Sargan test and robustness
of additional moment conditions with the Hansen
difference test. We recognize that any one estimator
may have ﬂaws; however, by examining the hypoth-
eses of interest across different estimators, we argue
that our results are appropriately conditioned to these
ﬂaws.
AR(1) specifications of democracy
We ﬁrst regress democracy on its ﬁrst period lag.
While the OLS and within-groups estimators are
inconsistent, these estimators are likely to be biased
in opposite directions and thus provide upper (OLS)
and lower (within groups) bounds for the IV and
GMMestimators (Bond, 2002). If the estimated coef-
ﬁcient for the AR(1) model falls within these bounds,
then we may proceed, with empirical evidence that
the model is well speciﬁed. On the other hand, were
the estimated coefﬁcient on the supposedly consis-
tent estimator to fall dramatically outside these
bounds, one would suspect severe ﬁnite sample bias
or inconsistency. We would, in this case, need to
more rigorously test our underlying assumptions
about the viability of the GMM estimators. Table 4
presents the AR(1) estimations of the democracy
measure.
We estimate a ﬁrst-order autoregressive model
with year-speciﬁc effects to account for common
cross-country shocks to the democracy variable.
The ﬁrst two columns present estimates of ρ with
heteroscedasticity consistent SEs. We reject the null
hypothesis of no serial correlation at the 1% level for
the OLS and within-groups estimators. The third
column is the just identiﬁed, consistent, Anderson-
Hsiao IV estimator. As expected, the OLS estimate
forms a lower bound while the within-groups esti-
mate forms an upper bound. The IV estimate lies
within these bounds.
With regards to the GMM estimates, the unrest-
ricted, one-step difference GMM estimate is within
the expected bounds. We reject the null hypothesis of
the Sargan test, however, suggesting that the model is
over identiﬁed. When we restrict the lag-length on the
instruments and collapse the instrument matrix, the
estimate is marginally above the OLS estimate of ρ.
Using forward orthogonal deviations in conjunction
with lag-length limits, a collapsed instrument matrix,
and the Windmeijer correction produces a higher esti-
mate of ρ. We suspect ﬁnite sample bias maymake the
difference GMM estimator inefﬁcient.
Turning to the system GMM estimator, the esti-
mated coefﬁcients for ρ are positive, lie within the
established bounds and are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. While we reject the null hypothesis of
the Sargan test with the unrestricted, one-step esti-
mator, suggesting the model is overidentiﬁed, con-
straining the instrument matrix appears to be an
appropriate correction. We reject the null of exogene-
ity using the difference-in-Hansen test for the two-
step system GMM estimator with a lag-limit of three
and collapsed and orthogonal instruments.
We thus have evidence to support our argument
that the AR(1) model is well speciﬁed for the democ-
racy series and the ranking of the OLS, within groups
and IV estimators is consistent with our a priori
expectations. While the difference GMM estimator
may be subject to ﬁnite sample bias, the system
7We also estimate the one-step GMM estimator with the lag-limits set to three or greater; the one-step GMM estimator with
the lag-limits set to three, and the one-step GMM estimator with collapsed, forward orthogonal instruments. These
estimates are available upon request.























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1872 L. E. Armey and R. M. McNab
GMM estimator lies within the established bounds,
regardless of restrictions on lag-length or the compo-
sition of the instrument matrix. These results suggest
the systemGMMestimator is most appropriate to test
our hypotheses of interest; we will, however, con-
tinue to present the results of the other estimators for
comparative purposes.
Democracy and termination of civil wars
A priori, we would believe, on the basis of the litera-
ture and political statements, that the termination of a
civil war is an opportunity for democracy to ‘ﬂour-
ish’. We would expect a positive and statistically
signiﬁcant relationship between the termination of a
civil war and democracy in the succeeding period. As
before, we employ the OLS and within-groups esti-
mators to establish the bounds for the IV and GMM
estimators (Table 5).
We ﬁnd that the end of a civil war negatively
impacts democracy in the succeeding 5-year period.
This relationship is consistent and statistically sig-
niﬁcant across the IV, difference GMM and system
GMM estimators. The relatively inefﬁcient IV esti-
mator suggests that the termination of a civil war in
time t–1 leads to a decline in the democracy score by
3.35 in time t. The affect is similar in the difference
GMM models, except in the most restrictive model
(15). We fail to reject the null hypotheses of over-
identiﬁcation in the one-step model with collapsed
instruments (14) and the fully restricted model (15).
The estimated coefﬁcient from the difference GMM
estimators, particularly model (15), with a lag-limit
of 3 and a collapsed, orthogonal instrument matrix,
are, however, well outside the upper bound estab-
lished by the OLS estimator, suggesting again that
the difference GMM estimator may not be appropri-
ate to test the hypotheses in question.
With regards to the system GMM estimator, we
ﬁnd that the termination of a civil war leads to a
decline in the democracy score. The democracy
score declines by approximately 2 in the unrestricted
system GMM model (16) to approximately 1.32 in
the two-step estimator with three lags, collapsed
instruments based on forward orthogonal deviations
(18). The estimated coefﬁcients for the system GMM
model are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level,
except for the two-step estimator, which is at 10%,
most likely due to the downward biased SEs. We fail
to reject the null hypotheses that the moment condi-
tions are valid and that instruments are exogenous in
the one-step model with collapsed instruments (17)
and the fully restricted model (18), suggesting that
the unrestricted model (16) is overidentiﬁed.
We thus conclude that the termination of civil war
negatively impacts democracy in the succeeding per-
iod. Our results for this bivariate estimation are con-
sistent whether we limit the instruments, collapse the
instrument matrix, employ forward orthogonal
deviations as instruments or use the Windmeijer cor-
rection. These results suggest that there is a lack of
empirical evidence for democracy ﬂourishing after
the conclusion of civil wars, and that, in practice, war
termination often leads to a consolidation of power
away from democracy.
Robustness checks
We now turn to the question of whether the estimated
coefﬁcient for the termination of civil war is robust to
the inclusion of additional explanatory variables and
changes in the set of instruments. Our set of condi-
tioning variables includes per capita GDP, openness
to international trade, population, natural resource
rents as a share of GDP and average education.
We ﬁnd, as with the bivariate regressions, that the
termination of a civil war negatively affects demo-
cratization in the succeeding 5-year period (Table 6).
For the difference GMM estimators, we fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the moment conditions are
valid for each of the models. The estimated coefﬁ-
cient for lagged democracy is within expected
bounds, and the coefﬁcient for civil war termination
is statistically signiﬁcant at 1% in the unrestricted
model and 5% in the restricted models. The marginal
effect of civil war termination for the difference
GMM models with controls is slightly larger than
the bivariate difference GMM models, with the ter-
mination of a civil war leading to reduction of
approximately 3 points in the unrestricted model
(21) to approximately 4.83 points for the fully
restricted model (23).
For the system GMM estimator, we fail to reject
the null hypotheses that the moment conditions are
valid and that the instruments are exogenous for the
one-step (25) and two-step restricted models (26).
We do reject the null hypothesis that the moment
conditions are valid for the unrestricted model (24)
and thus conclude that the unrestricted model is over-
identiﬁed. The estimated coefﬁcient for lagged
democracy is within expected bounds, and the coef-
ﬁcient for civil war termination is statistically














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































How does a war end change political outcomes? 1875
signiﬁcant at 1% for the restricted system GMM
models. War termination leads to a decline in democ-
racy by approximately 2 points in the succeeding
period.
We also note that, in our preferred system GMM
estimates, education appears to positively inﬂuence
democratization, a result previously found in the
literature. Education is signiﬁcant at the 5% level
(25) and at the 1% level (24, 26). The estimates for
education, however, appear sensitive to the choice of
estimator, as the estimated coefﬁcients are insignif-
icant for the IV and difference GMM estimators.
Finally, we ﬁnd scant evidence to corroborate sig-
niﬁcant impacts from the control variables suggested
in the literature. Our results cast doubt on the sugges-
tion that countries experiencing civil war democratize
for the same reasons as those unaffected by civil war
(Fortna and Huang, 2012). Despite any impacts war
may have on development, or that development may
have on war, countries that have experiencedwar have
lower subsequent levels of democratization.
Characteristics of civil war
The evidence to this point strongly suggests that the
termination of a civil war leads to a decline in democ-
racy in the succeeding period, although the magnitude
of this effect depends on the choice of estimator and
restrictions on instruments. Controlling for the end of
civil war, we now explore whether the characteristics
of its termination impact democratization in the suc-
ceeding period. We examine whether the duration of a
civil war, whether the war ends with a stalemate,
whether the rebels win the civil war and whether the
UN intervenes at the termination of the civil war have
a signiﬁcant impact on democratization.
We present the estimates from the difference and
system GMM estimators in Table 7. We continue to
use the control variables presented in the previous
section.8 For the restricted difference GMM models
(28, 29), the estimated coefﬁcient for the end of a
civil war is no longer statistically signiﬁcant. We do
ﬁnd, however, that UN intervention is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% (27, 28) and 5% (29)
level. While duration appears to affect democratiza-
tion, the result is fragile and becomes statistically
insigniﬁcant in the fully restricted difference GMM
model. Likewise, rebel victory appears to lower
democratization in the succeeding period, although
the estimated coefﬁcient becomes insigniﬁcant in the
most restrictive model. The unrestricted difference
GMM estimator (27) appears overidentiﬁed as we
reject the null hypothesis that the moment conditions
are appropriate. We again caution that the difference
GMM estimator is likely to be less efﬁcient than the
system GMM estimator and may suffer from ﬁnite
sample bias.
Turning to the preferred system GMM estimators,
the estimated coefﬁcient for the termination of civil
war is negative and, unlike the difference GMM esti-
mator, statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level for all
models. UN intervention is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant while rebel victory is negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all models.
Duration, on the other hand, appears to have a nega-
tive impact on democratization in the succeeding per-
iod, although this result is fragile to restrictions on the
instruments. We once again reject the null hypotheses
of proper moment conditions and exogeneity of the
instruments for the unrestricted model (30). For the
restricted models (31, 32), we fail to reject these nulls,
making these our preferred estimates.
These results suggest that the conditions under
which a civil war ends are important indicators of a
country’s subsequent political development. The
positive impact of UN intervention suggests that an
outside party can serve to ameliorate the adverse
effect of war termination on democratization. Rebel
victories, however, appear to have a negative effect
on democratization, suggesting that rebel movements
are either unprepared for democratic governance or
are using claims of ﬁghting for democracy as a form
of propaganda.
Alternative measures of democracy
Next, we turn to the question of whether our measure
of democracy inﬂuences the results above. We con-
struct two alternative measures of democracy that
range from 1979 to 2004. The ﬁrst measure is the
adjusted Polity IV democracy score. We derive the
second measure from the FreedomHouse’s measures
of civil liberties and political rights, and normalize
bothmeasures of democracy for comparability with 0
being a complete lack of democracy and 1 being
completely democratic. We also constrain the data
to the same samples for this test. We continue to
caution that the Freedom House measure of
8The full results, including estimated coefﬁcients and SEs for the control variables, are available upon request.
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democracy is biased by the inclusion of freedom
from war as one of its criteria, and we are unable to
ascertain the extent to which war affects the measures
of civil liberties and political rights. This bias should
lead to a positive bias in the post-war coefﬁcient. For
the discussion in this section, we only present the
system GMM estimates given our previous concerns
about the difference GMM estimator.
In Table 8, we ﬁrst compare results of the bivariate
estimations for the Normalized Polity and Freedom
House scores. The estimated coefﬁcients for the ter-
mination of civil war are negative and statistically
signiﬁcant in both models, although the coefﬁcient
for the Freedom House measure of democracy is
biased upward, as expected. For the system GMM
estimator with collapsed, orthogonal instruments and
Windmeijer corrected SEs, we reject the null hypoth-
esis of the exogeneity of instruments for the
Normalized Polity model but fail to reject for the
Freedom House model.
For the fully speciﬁed models, we reject the null of
proper moment conditions for the unrestricted mod-
els (35, 36) and proceed to estimate the most
restricted models (37, 38). We fail to reject the null
of proper moment conditions and instrument exo-
geneity for the restricted models.
The estimated coefﬁcient for the end of a civil war
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level
in all models, continuing to support the previous
results of a negative impact of civil war termination
on democratization. UN intervention is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level in all models
except the restricted Freedom House model. Rebel
victory is insigniﬁcant in both restricted models,
although it is negative and signiﬁcant in both unrest-
ricted models. The negative coefﬁcients for the
Table 7. Democracy, war termination and war characteristics
(27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32)
Difference GMM Difference GMM Difference GMM System GMM System GMM System GMM
Democracyt–5 0.554** 0.705* 0.530* 0.627** 0.574** 0.711**
(0.140) (0.305) (0.237) (0.0863) (0.143) (0.123)
War endt–5 −1.179 −2.266 −2.015 −1.798* −1.922* −1.965*
(0.753) (1.839) (3.149) (0.879) (0.899) (0.936)
UN interventiont–5 4.319** 4.768** 3.219* 2.705* 2.519* 3.057**
(1.152) (1.075) (1.442) (1.091) (1.240) (0.830)
Durationt–5 −0.243* −0.218+ −0.245 −0.134+ −0.132+ −0.123
(0.107) (0.113) (0.455) (0.0708) (0.0755) (0.0783)
Stalematet–5 1.115 1.811 −1.645 3.003** 2.853* 1.610+
(1.304) (1.990) (9.165) (1.007) (1.119) (0.853)
Rebel victoryt–5 −6.907+ −6.226+ −6.168 −4.681** −4.774** −4.264**
(3.548) (3.291) (5.968) (1.375) (1.433) (1.475)
Constant 4.433 6.609 5.967
(5.033) (7.688) (7.721)
Observations 317 394 394 492 492 492
M1 −2.906** −2.103* −1.811* −3.962** −2.475** −2.947**
M2 −1.184 0.160 −0.234 0.336 0.162 0.370
Lag limits All 3 3 All 3 3
Number of
instruments







One or two step One One Two One One Two
Sargan test 38.251+ 4.957 3.363 89.826* 14.67 14.25
Difference-in-
Hansen test
– – – 24.353+ 0.171 1.112
Notes: See Table 4. Controls include the log of GDP, population, openness to international trade, rents to GDP and
education. The full and additional estimations are available upon request. **, * and + denote signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1878 L. E. Armey and R. M. McNab
Freedom House model appear to be upward biased
relative to the Normalized Polity model.
Alternate dynamic specification
Considerable debate has arisen in the literature as to
the appropriate way to measure democracy.
Bollen (1993), Przeworski (2000), Elkins (2000),
and Munck and Verkuilen (2002), among many
others, argue whether democracy is discrete or con-
tinuous. More recent discussion is whether democ-
racy should be treated as dichotomous, ordinal or
continuous. In order to address possible concerns,
here we treat democracy as discrete and model it as
a count variable.We feel a dynamicmodel is the most
appropriate of these kinds of models because the
level of democracy is slow to change. Thus, we
have converted the polity data to nonnegative inte-
gers and have followed Wooldridge’s (2005) techni-
que for estimating a dynamic count model. In
addition to allowing integer values, Wooldridge’s
model controls for ﬁxed effects by modelling them
on initial conditions of independent variables.
Table 9 shows the results using this model, which
generally support the same conclusions as our other
models. Speciﬁcally, lagged democracy is an important
determinant of present democracy. War termination
signiﬁcantly and negatively affects subsequent democ-
racy. UN intervention and stalemates both have sig-
niﬁcant positive impacts on subsequent democracy.
These results are all signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The continuing discussion of intervention in Syria is
couched in the language of freedom, democracy and
civil liberties. President Obama, in a meeting with the
Emir of Qatar, stated that the two nations are seeking
to remove Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and
‘strengthen an opposition that can bring about a
democratic Syria that represents all people and
respects their rights’ (Talev, 2013). UN Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon noted recently that, ‘The pro-
spects may seem dim, but I remain convinced that a
political solution is possible. This is the only way to
end the bloodshed and bring about a new and demo-
cratic Syria’ (Yan, 2013).
We ﬁnd scant evidence to support these policy
statements. Instead, we ﬁnd empirically robust evi-
dence that the termination of a civil war negatively
impacts democracy in the succeeding period. This
evidence appears to be robust and statistically sig-
niﬁcant across a number of speciﬁcations, instrument
sets and measures of democracy. While many hope
that the end of internal conﬂict will promote the
emergence of a democratic society, our ﬁndings sug-
gest that the post-conﬂict environment leads to more
authoritarian regimes. Moreover, we ﬁnd that it is
unlikely that rebel victories will assure democratic
transitions. Evidence suggests that rebels are more
likely to undermine existing democratic institutions
than to implement reforms. Supporting stalemates,
not rebels, appears to be a better policy solution for
promoting democratization.
We do ﬁnd evidence to suggest that external inter-
vention, through the UN, may increase democratiza-
tion in the succeeding period. This ﬁnding appears
relatively robust. We argue that this appears to support
the argument that outside intervention can promote
democratization after a period of internal conﬂict, a
situation where democratization is not otherwise
likely. The parties may require an independent arbiter
not only to separate them but also to moderate discus-
sion and the emergence of democracy.
Table 9. Alternative estimation









Polity Countt–5 0.11** 0.11** 0.09** 0.10**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
War endt–5 – −0.19** −0.20** −0.33**
(0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
UN interventiont–5 – – – 0.47**
(0.11)
Stalematet–5 – – – 0.33**
(0.10)
Durationt–5 – – – 0.005
(0.009)
Constant 1.16** 1.18** 1.51** 1.54**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.24) (0.24)
Observations 709 709 559 559
Number of
instruments
1 2 8 11
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: See Table 4. Controls include the log of GDP,
population, openness to international trade, rents to GDP
and average years of schooling. The full and additional
estimations are available upon request. **, * and + denote
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The ﬁndings in this article suggest that further
research is needed into the impact of civil war on
institutions and into government capacity more
broadly. Measures of institutional development,
such as corruption and the rule of law, may also be
affected by civil war and may be equally important to
democratic representation as long-run indicators of
political well-being. Moreover, our future research
aims include investigating how post-war countries
allocate expenditures in order to understand under
what circumstances countries break out of the devel-
opment trap that is civil war.
A more difﬁcult question is whether or not the
termination of civil war is endogenous with respect
to democratization. If lower levels of democracy lead
to civil war, then does the onset of civil war lead to
lower levels of democracy and longer war duration
(or a lack of termination)? As the onset and termina-
tion of civil wars are discrete events, this creates the
question of how to approach a dynamic estimation of
the inﬂuence of civil war termination on democrati-
zation. Our initial evidence suggests that this ques-
tion will be of increased interest in the future.
Taken together, this article’s ﬁndings suggest cau-
tion: merely negotiating a conclusion to civil war is
insufﬁcient to promote democracy. We ﬁnd that suc-
cessful rebellions are unlikely to lead to democracy
despite their rhetoric. External intervention, and
potentially stalemates at the end of conﬂict, appears
to support the movement towards a more democratic
and representative society.
Disclosure statement
No potential conﬂict of interest was reported by the
authors.
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Supplemental data for this article can be accessed
here.
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